

Embodiment, Folk Dualism, and the Convergence of Cosmology and Anthropology in Paul’s Resurrection Ideals

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Post-Print

See published article for up-to-date text and pagination:

“Embodiment, Folk Dualism, and the Convergence of Cosmology and Anthropology in Paul’s Resurrection Ideals.” *Biblical Interpretation* 23 (2015): 428–55. DOI: 10.1163/15685152-00230P06.

Abstract

While scholarly treatments of Paul rightly understand his cosmology and anthropology as interconnected, two disjunctive tendencies are seldom reconciled. On the one hand, there is a general trend toward viewing Paul’s cosmology through the lens of a Jewish apocalypticism that is dualistically configured; on the other, Paul’s anthropology is usually seen as essentially monistic. This paper redresses this dualism/monism incongruence. By locating Paul within an overlapping matrix of antique Jewish and Greek traditions, the apostle is seen to work within a dualistic framework that is characterized by partitive interrelation rather than opposition. This argument is conceptualized and articulated with an eye toward notions of folk dualism, which cognitive scientists suggest is a natural by-product of human embodiment. Attention is specifically given to 1 Cor. 15.30–50, where Paul envisions a risen existence that is cosmologically and somatically fashioned vis-à-vis such integrative tension.

Keywords

Paul; resurrection; cosmology; body; dualism/monism; 1 Corinthians 15

Introduction

The apostle Paul’s resurrection ideals stand at the intersection of his cosmological and anthropological understandings. On the one hand, Paul understands resurrection as a distinctly bodily affair; he looks toward the future “redemption of [believers’] bodies” (Rom. 8.23) when their earthly “body of humiliation” (Phil. 3.21) will be “clothed over with [the] dwelling from heaven” (2 Cor. 5.3). On the other hand, Paul always couples these somatic descriptions with notions of cosmological transformation. In addition to stressing metaphors of alteration (e.g.

plant growth, clothing exchange, moving in and out of a house, adoption, etc.), Paul also stresses notions of cosmological transposition; he models his understanding of risen bodies on that of celestial glory-bodies (e.g. Rom. 8.17–18; 1 Cor. 15.40–41) and even insists that believers will one day share in Christ’s own risen “body of glory” (Phil. 3.21; cf. 1 Cor. 2.8; 2 Cor. 3.18; 4.4–6; Rom. 8.29).

While the interconnectivity of cosmology and anthropology is generally acknowledged in Paul’s resurrection ideals, scholarly discussions usually take divergent perspectives on how Paul’s worldview is to be interpreted. In many modern treatments Paul is read within the context of an apocalypticism characterized by opposition (e.g. heaven *vs.* earth; now *vs.* then), thus advocating a strong degree of cosmological dualism between the earthly and the heavenly. At the same time, however, Paul’s anthropology is usually understood within the context of an assumed Jewish monism, expressly rejecting any whiff of what is generally regarded (and often dubiously constructed) as Greek dualism. What emerges, then, is a confused discussion of both dualism and monism, and this has implications for Paul’s resurrection ideals. This is not because the concept of resurrection is understood dualistically/monistically (*per se*), but rather because resurrection is wrapped-up part-in-parcel with cosmology and anthropology, both of which are scholarly hot beds of dualism–monism debates. Seeking to bring clarity amongst such confusion, this study examines the way in which dualism and monism relate to Paul’s cosmological presuppositions.

In what sense Dualism, and is Monism the only Alternative?

It will be helpful first to identify more clearly what one means by dualism and monism. I begin with Paul's cosmology, which is indelibly wrapped-up in Jewish apocalyptic.¹ Of particular note is the influential work of Ernst Käsemann, who understood Paul's apocalypticism to be essentially *eschatological* and characterized by a strongly demarcated set of dualistic presuppositions.² For example, Käsemann insisted that humanity exists in relation to the cosmos, which is to say that human beings stand in relation to one of two opposing cosmic powers (either Christ or Sin).³ Central to Käsemann's thesis is the positing of a fundamental eschatological break between two aeonic spheres; one that is earthly, conditioned by *σάρξ* and characterized by disobedience, the other that is heavenly, conditioned by *πνεῦμα* and characterized by obedience.⁴ He speaks, for example, of the fleshly person as "demonically enslaved" and under "alien rule" to the cosmic power of Sin, which is the "opponent" of God (Käsemann 1980: 204, 208, and 205 respectively).⁵ Käsemann's apocalyptic dualism is strong here, and while he (rightly) understands the human body as inextricably wrapped-up in the cosmos,⁶ his dualistic commitments fight against and ultimately preclude such one-world ideals.

¹) I use the term "cosmology" (here and throughout) in a philosophical (even materialist) sense to denote the cosmos, the physical universe in which human beings exist and move. By contrast, I am intentionally not using "cosmology" in the (modern) apocalyptic sense of the world of supra-human forces in which human beings finds themselves, and to which humanity must declare allegiance. Accordingly, when I use the term "cosmosomatic" (later in this paper), I am referring not to an inter-subjective disposition of the human subject toward cosmic powers, but rather pointing toward the location of the human body within the cosmological structure of the antique universe (however that be constructed). Though the aforementioned apocalyptic sense of "cosmology" descriptively makes sense of many literary motifs within much Jewish and Christian apocalyptic, when Paul's apocalypticism is placed within a broader context of antique thought such particularity run the risk of obscuring rather than illuminating.

²) See especially Käsemann 1969.

³) So Käsemann (1971: 27): "there is no such thing as man without his particular and respective world."

⁴) For example, the key eschatological distinction for Käsemann (1964: 133) is the realm within which humanity exists: the human being "is qualified by [its] present Lord, by [its] present allegiance, because the power of the cosmos in the *σάρξ* and the power of Christ in the *πνεῦμα* are fighting over [the human] body."

⁵) All quotations refer to Rom. 7.14–25.

⁶) Thus Käsemann (1980: 176): "corporeality is standing in a world for which different forces contend and in whose conflict each individual is caught up, belonging to one lord or the other and representing this lord both

Indeed, for Käsemann (1971: 9) it is the radical break between old and new that stands as the hallmark of Paul's resurrection ideals: "discontinuity is the mark of both existence and history."

The influence Käsemann has exerted on scholarship pertaining to resurrection belief in Paul cannot be overemphasized.⁷ Martinus de Boer (1988), for instance, presumes Käsemann's dualistic portrayal and even intensifies it;⁸ dualistic language abounds throughout Boer's study, as *opposition* is understood as the taken-for-granted axiom of Paul's apocalyptic ideals.⁹

Similarly, despite Edward Adams's (2000) astute insistence that cosmology is constructed differently depending on the social contexts of Paul's communities, Adams nonetheless takes dualism as the default starting point for the apocalyptically informed cosmology of 1 Corinthians.¹⁰ It should be noted, however, both Boer and Adams rightly recognize that "apocalyptic eschatology" is, as Boer (1988: 7) says, a "construct of scholars." Crispin Fletcher-Louis (2011) has recently offered a critique of this scholarly construct, specifically pointing to the German tradition as the strongest articulation of such dualistic tendencies. So, for example, Philipp Vielhauer and Georg Strecker (1991: 2.549) argue that dualism is "the essential feature

actively and passively. . . . it is clear that we are never autonomous, but always participate in a definite world and stand under lordship." The present study seeks to retain some of this cosmo-somatic interrelation while simultaneously eschewing many of the dualistic particulars that Käsemann took for granted.

⁷⁾ See especially Tannehill 1967.

⁸⁾ For example, Boer (1988) argues that Paul presents death as a "hypostatize[d] . . . quasi-angelic . . . power" which has been brought under the cosmic lordship of Christ (p. 139, compare pp. 21–23). Insisting that death "marks 'this age' as radically discontinuous from 'the age to come'" (p. 88), Boer argues that Death has been brought under the cosmic lordship of Christ in as much as "the gospel . . . has unmasked the fact that behind the universal human reality of physical dying there is an inimical, cosmological power at work, a power of 'this age' that as such is doomed for destruction" (p. 138).

⁹⁾ Boer's (1988: 181) conclusion, for example, includes some of his most strikingly dualistic expressions including the strong oppositions of the two ages, descriptions of division between the "human world and God," and the description of the present age as "the all embracing epoch or sphere of death, viz., the epoch or sphere in which human beings are separated or excluded from the divine presence and life."

¹⁰⁾ On dualism and Jewish apocalyptic, see especially Adams 2000: 105–07; on the implications of this perspective on resurrection (esp. 1 Cor 15), see pp. 145–46. Adams rightly removes the presumption of strong dualism generally in Paul's cosmology, though such freeing is due to Paul's forming a social rhetoric in Romans that is not dependent upon the aforementioned apocalyptic frame (pp. 151–220). In 1 Corinthians and even Galatians, by contrast, Paul is seen as "fore[ed] . . . into a narrow apocalyptic social and spatio-temporal dualism" (p. 193).

of Apocalyptic.”¹¹ Such emphases are less pronounced in the Anglo-American tradition, though they still persist. While John Collins (1979) prefers the language of *transcendence* to *dualism*,¹² such an emphasis is not counterbalanced by any significant treatment of *imminence* (thus retaining a dualistic quality).¹³ By way of contrast, the work of Christopher Rowland (1982) stresses both the vertical (cosmological) and horizontal (temporal) axes of apocalyptic within a more integrated system.¹⁴ By placing *revelation* rather than *eschatology* at the centre of Jewish apocalyptic, dualism is no longer seen as *the* essential feature, even if many apocalypses stress concepts or contain language that leans in such directions.¹⁵ To this end, much of the cosmological dualism that Käsemann (and others) take for granted is rightly problematized.¹⁶

As already noted, Käsemann understands cosmology and anthropology as inextricable,¹⁷ and while he views the former as fundamentally dualistic, his anthropological commitments are much more monistic. That is to say, Paul envisions the “whole man” rather than any kind of

¹¹⁾ They continue by insisting that “dualism . . . dominates [the] thought-world” of the apocalypses.

¹²⁾ Collins (1979: 9) stresses the revelatory nature of the apocalyptic genre as concerned with a “*transcendent* reality which is both temporal, insofar as it envisages *eschatological* salvation, and spatial insofar as it involves *another, supernatural world*” (emphasis added).

¹³⁾ So noted by Fletcher-Louis 2011: 2.1577–1588 (see especially p. 2.1586).

¹⁴⁾ Rowland (1982: 73–189) understands the apocalypses as concerning both eschatology and history (thus, the horizontal axis); both the transcendent heavenly realm and also the purposes of God here on earth (thus, the vertical axis). For Rowland, the key feature of apocalyptic is the “revelation of the divine mysteries through a vision or some other form of immediate disclosure” (p. 70).

¹⁵⁾ To insist that dualism is not *the* central element of apocalyptic literature does not deny the important role that opposition plays in these texts (or in the employment of apocalyptic modes of thinking). One cannot escape the reality that apocalyptic includes descriptions of “this age” and “the age to come,” the contrasting of the forces of God and the forces of Evil, and the elaboration of all that such contrasting is normally taken to involve. Indeed, one need look no further than 1 Cor 15.20–28 for just such an example. As argued below, though opposition is a pronounced feature of apocalyptic, it should not be taken as the determinative point of definition; apocalyptic has a far more holistic vision, and oppositional motifs ultimately work in the service of this integrative end.

¹⁶⁾ To suggest that Käsemann and others take cosmological dualism for granted is to question the extent to which apocalypticism functions as a so-called worldview, distinct and different from other worldviews of the first century CE. This paper seeks to recognize the multivalent nature of Paul’s apocalyptic language, language that was certainly employed throughout Paul’s letters but is broadly integrated into issues of empire (1 Thess 4.13–5.11), ethnicity and covenant inclusion (Gal 4.1–7), ethics (Rom 6–8), and in the case of our text (1 Cor 15, comp. 1 Cor 1–4), popular philosophy. While Paul certainly works with and draws upon the categories of Jewish apocalyptic, his worldview is more broadly elaborated and not limited to what Boer (1988: 7) rightly identifies as a “construct of scholars.”

¹⁷⁾ In Käsemann’s (1971: 27) words: “anthropology is cosmology *in concreto*.”

partitive anthropology (Käsemann 1971: 26), and on this point Käsemann is in general agreement with the scholarly consensus of his day.¹⁸ Käsemann's Doktorvater Rudolf Bultmann also argued for anthropological holism, though his understanding of such a concept differed significantly.¹⁹ Bultmann (1951–1955: 1.209) upholds the human being as a “living unity” that exists in a constant state of *introspective tension*,²⁰ which is to say that the human self is engaged in a hegemonic struggle between the “I” and the “not-I.”²¹ Somewhat ironically, though Bultmann rejects a so-called Gnostic/Greek body–soul dualism, he nonetheless advocates an implicit (and ontologically stark) *Cartesian dualism* of knowing subject (I) and known object (not-I),²² thus undermining his insistence upon anthropological monism. This is evident in his understanding of *σῶμα* as referring to the “self;”²³ suggesting that Paul can use *σῶμα* to refer either to “the self under the rule of *sarx*” (as in Rom. 6.12; 7.24) or the self under the rule of the *πνεῦμα* (i.e., the “Spirit-ruled soma”), Bultmann (1951–1955: 1.198–201) interprets Paul's description of the risen body—the *σῶμα πνευματικόν* (1 Cor. 15.44)—as referring to “the self [as] determined by the power of God.” The risen body, then, is not a body *per se*, but rather a mode of existence in which the Spirit of God is infused.²⁴ Though modern scholars are often

¹⁸) For example, Robinson (1952: 11) stresses the (then) scholarly consensus that, “in his anthropology [Paul is] fundamentally . . . a Hebrew of the Hebrews.”

¹⁹) Indeed, a significant debate ensued between the two, and it has been conveniently summarized by Wasserman 2007: 795–800.

²⁰) On body–soul dualism, see Bultmann 1951–1955: 1.201.

²¹) For Bultmann (1951–1955) this is specifically evident in Rom. 7.7–25. Here, Bultmann's Paul personifies sin and the flesh as a way of asserting that “self and self are at war with each other; i.e. to be innerly [sic] divided, or not to be at one with one's self, is the essence of human existence under sin” (p. 1.245). In 7.22, however, Paul's description of the “inner man” is understood as a reference to the “real self who can distinguish himself from his *soma*-self. . . . the ‘inner’ is man's real self in contrast to the self that has come under the sway of sin” (p. 1.203).

²²) So noted by Wasserman 2008: 52–53.

²³) So Bultmann (1951–1955: 1.194): “man does not *have a soma*; he *is soma*.” Bultmann later insists that Paul's “capacity for abstract thinking is not . . . developed,” thus resulting in the apostle's inability to “distinguish terminologically between *soma* in the basic sense of that which characterizes human existence and *soma* as the phenomenon of the material body” (p. 1.198).

²⁴) On this point, Bultmann's understanding of *σῶμα* as self is ironically *disembodied*, as it stresses the body-independent and immaterial ghost in the machine that characterizes Cartesian dualism.

critical of Bultmann, this sense of the Spirit-ruled self has been taken up by many. Murdoch Dahl (1962), for instance, argues that the earthly and risen bodies are animated by the soul and spirit respectively.²⁵ More recently, James Dunn (1998b), Anthony Thiselton (2000), and N. T. Wright (2003) have all made similar claims.²⁶ Despite the monistic veneer, all these exegetes implicitly ascribe to at least a folk-dualism that distinguishes between *body* (on the one hand) and *soul/spirit* (on the other).

There is, to be certain, nothing wrong with this kind of a dualistic conception; much depends, however, on what one means by *dualism*, a term that Philip Alexander (2011: 169) has noted is unfortunately “‘fuzzy’ and hard to define, but [which] no one seems able totally to avoid or to replace with a less problematic substitute.” While some prefer to distinguish dualism from duality,²⁷ recent advancements in the cognitive sciences suggest there is good reason to suspect that our inability to move past the term is related to the nature of human embodiment generally. There is a growing body of literature that suggests dualistic modes of thought universally pervade human cultures. For some, this natural inclination is understood in a *strong*, Cartesian sense; so Paul Bloom (2006: 211, emphasis added): “people universally think of human consciousness as *separate* from the physical realm.”²⁸ More preferable to Bloom is the recent work of Edward Slingerland and Maciej Chudek (2011), who examine mind–body dualism in

²⁵ Dahl (1962) attributes this position to the accepted exegesis of his day (p. 15), though his own analysis recasts that position in light of a presumed and more radically drawn Hebraic monism (p. 81).

²⁶ Dunn (1998b: 60) and Wright (2003: 347–356) both distinguish between two different *bodies*, one that *embodies the soul* and the other that *embodies the spirit*. In a similar way, Thiselton (2000: 1277) argues that Paul envisions a body that is “more than physical but not less [than the earthly body],” and further that *σῶμα πνευματικόν* refers to a “mode or pattern of intersubjective life directed by the Holy Spirit.”

²⁷ In this view, dualism is narrowly defined as a radical and ontological break between opposing concepts/forces, whereas duality is understood as a weaker and more attenuated term whereby a broad range of distinctions stand in varying degrees of opposition (cf. Wright 1992: 252–256).

²⁸ See also Bloom (2004: 191): “[people are dualists] who have two ways of looking at the world: in terms of bodies and in terms of souls. A direct consequence of this dualism is the idea that bodies and souls are separate.”

antique eastern tradition.²⁹ While it is well known that dualistic assertions pervade western philosophy, Slingerland and Chudek demonstrate the presence of *weak* mind–body dualism in pre-Qin China (pre-221 BCE). Elsewhere, Slingerland (2008: 3) rightly insists, “when the ‘dualistic West’ is contrasted with other, presumably more holistic, cultures, what is really being picked out is the singular intensity with which mind–body dualism has been articulated [in the West].” At issue, then, is not the formal—or strong—dualism of the West, but rather a more commonsensical—or weak—dualism as a characteristic aspect of human cognition across cultures; it is this latter sense that I primarily refer to as *folk dualism*, even though stronger expressions are themselves built-up from the weaker default.

By *folk dualism* I mean notions of dualism that are intuitive and not necessarily wrapped-up—or worked-out—in any formal, systematic way. To say these notions are intuitive is to insist they emerge as a result of embodied human existence in the world (including both cognitive processing and somatic functioning).³⁰ This is not to deny or downplay the fact that different types of dualisms are variously constructed across human cultures (whether they be weak (less formal or taken-for-granted) or strong (more formal)). Rather, it is to insist that all human beings have a proclivity toward dualistic modes of thought that, generally speaking, cause certain capacities (such as thought, emotion, personhood, physiology, etc.) to cluster together and gravitate toward certain poles (such as in/out, mind/body, etc.).³¹ Folk dualism, then, points

²⁹⁾ See further, Edward Slingerland (2013).

³⁰⁾ That is to say, notions of folk dualism emerge because of the kinds of brains and bodies human beings possess, function and interacting in the kinds of habitual environments in which they act. Related to this is the growing body of evidence that posits the naturalness of “theory of mind” (i.e., folk understandings that cause human beings from a very early age to distinguish between animate and inanimate things), thus suggesting that humans are “born to be dualists” (Slingerland 2008: 26).

³¹⁾ The strength of advocating a *weak* rather than *strong folk dualism* thesis stems from the recognition that many cultures do not advance a simple either/or position of mind and body. Instead, weak folk dualism allows for the recognition that “mind-stuff and body-stuff [can] overlap and interact, ... [even if] human cognition will tend to cluster person-concepts around these attractors” (Slingerland and Chudek 2011: 998).

toward patterns of human thought that, though variously understood, are cross-culturally recurrent and emergent from shared patterns of embodiment.

Given the naturalness (as it were) of such *folk dualism* as a seemingly universal feature of human cognition, it seems likely—indeed, inevitable—that Paul functions with at least some set of dualistic assumptions. In light of these cross-cultural insights, the question is not whether Paul is best read as a dualist or monist; rather, it is better to enquire as to *what kinds of dualistic and monistic tendencies are present in Paul’s cosmology and anthropology*. If we (rightly) reject Cartesian dualism (*material body vs. immaterial mind*) on grounds of anachronism,³² in what sense does Paul function with notions of cosmological and/or anthropological dualism? In light of the growing cross-disciplinary evidence for at least *weak folk dualism* in all human cultures, the present study seeks a more coherent framework for Paul’s resurrection ideals, one that is not bifurcated into cosmological dualism and anthropological monism.

Concentric Circles of Cultural Embodiment

With the hopes of eschewing a *cultural dualism* that strenuously shoehorns Paul into the dubious either/or choice between unitary Jewish monism and partitive Greek dualism,³³ this study suggests that Paul is best located within many interlocking contexts (e.g. within both Jewish and Greek traditions). This is not to deny that certain traditions are more prevalent in Paul than others, nor to unhelpfully conflate differing cultural streams with one another. Rather, it is to

³²⁾ This has been expressly argued by Martin (1995: 3–37), who rightly notes: “*all the Cartesian oppositions—matter versus nonmatter, physical versus spiritual, corporeal (or physical) versus psychological, nature versus supernature—are misleading when retrojected into ancient language*” (p. 15, emphasis original).

³³⁾ Compare, for instance, the older work of John Robinson with Emma Wasserman’s more recent treatment: though Robinson (1952: 12) argues that “Greek presuppositions . . . are simply misleading if made the starting point” for examining Paul’s anthropology, Wasserman (2013) insists that the recognition of Platonic categories helps construct a more coherent picture of the apostle’s writings. The present study follows Wasserman’s more integrative approach.

recognize that Paul is able to draw on several differing backgrounds in constructing meaning.

The following analysis will travel from the inside out through three concentric circles of cultural embodiment—Jewish apocalyptic (the inner circle), second temple and early Judaism generally (the broader circle), and Hellenistic philosophy (the broadest circle). As we will see, in each of these circles issues of cosmology and anthropology are premised on a one-world model most often characterized by integration rather than opposition.

The Inner Cultural Circle—Jewish Apocalyptic

Given that Paul correlates his understanding of resurrection with his understanding of rapture, likely conceptualising the former in terms of the latter,³⁴ heavenly ascent traditions reveal much about the nature of Paul's cosmo-somatic ideals. Within Jewish apocalypticism, which

(arguably) constitutes the formulaic core of Paul's thought, ascent traditions configure heaven and earth as vertically aligned and premised on notions of permeability rather than separation.

This is particularly evident in the many traditions that presume a storied universe whereby access to the heavenly realms is possible. The existence of multiple heavenly layers is common in the broader period literature, with descriptions of one, three, five, or even seven layers all denoting a vertical structure that extends upward toward a cosmic pinnacle.³⁵ The Enochic *Book of*

Watchers stands as an early witness within this tradition (*1 En.* 14.8–9),³⁶ and the later

Similitudes of Enoch also recounts two heavenly ascents (*1 En.* 39.3; 70–71), one of which seems

³⁴) This is particularly evident from Paul's use of ἀρπάζω, which is used to describe both the transformation of the living at the eschaton (1 Thess. 4.17) and the ascent of a visionary (2 Cor. 12.2, 4). The relationship between resurrection and rapture has long been noted by NT scholars (among others, see Bousset 1901; Segal 1980, 1998; Økland 2009; and Shantz 2009).

³⁵) See, for example, the *Book of Watchers* (one heaven), 2 Cor. 12 and the *T. Levi* (three heavens), 3 *Bar.* (five heavens), and 2 *En.* and *Apoc. Ab.* (seven heavens). For an overview, see Collins 1995.

³⁶) Note the use of ἐπαίρω / ܐܠܘܢܐ to describe heavenly ascent (*1 En.* 14.8–9; Aramaic from 4Q204 1 VI, 21).

to presume a storied heavenly structure (cf. *1 En.* 70–71).³⁷ Such layers are explicit in Paul (cf. 2 Cor. 12.1–10), and they are variously articulated in ascent apocalypses that postdate the turn of the eras. For example, the post-Pauline *Apoc. Ab.* envisions seven heavenly layers and describes an ascent (15.4–7; cf. 12.10) whereby Abraham is directed in ch. 20 to look down at the stars beneath him (a cosmological reversal of Gen. 15.5). Though alternative understandings of heaven–earth spatial relations existed,³⁸ what is of note for our purposes is the construction of vertically distinct cosmological locales that are mutually permeable.

Many of these traditions correlate heavenly transposition with some form of transformation, specifically in the direction of angelomorphism. The so-called Self-Glorification Hymn from Qumran stands as a striking example;³⁹ the Hymn’s speaker repeatedly insists that he shares in angelic “glory” (כבוד, lines 13–15, 18), that his desires are not according to the flesh (line 14), and that he is reckoned with the “angels/gods” (אלים, lines 12, 14–15, 18).⁴⁰ The language is unequivocally strong,⁴¹ and it seems to point to the angelic transformation of a human figure.⁴² While other traditions use more graphic images such as flesh melting off the ascender’s body (e.g. *1 En.* 71.11), the most common metaphor is that of clothing exchange.⁴³ In

³⁷⁾ Though the *Similitudes* generally envision a single heaven, the reference in *1 En.* 71.5 to the “heaven of heavens” may envision a multiplicity of heavenly layers (cf. Himmelfarb 1993: 59–61).

³⁸⁾ For instance, Alexander (2006: 118–119; 2011) draws attention to (what he calls) a “more sophisticated” understanding of heaven and earth as parallel universes, not *on top* of each other but rather *beside* or even *within* one another. Alexander is correct to draw attention to this aspect of broader Jewish thought, though even these descriptions are often correlated with notions of verticality (e.g. *T. Levi* 5.1–3).

³⁹⁾ Though this fragmentary Hymn does not have an explicit reference to heavenly ascent, such may well be implied. The Hymn is likely sectarian and the surviving manuscripts date to the turn of the eras (Angel 2010: 585–588).

⁴⁰⁾ All references correspond to Recension B (4Q491 11 I).

⁴¹⁾ For example, Davila (1999: 475) notes the similarities between the Hymn and the much later *3 Enoch* on the issue of heavenly transformation.

⁴²⁾ Though initially titled “Cantique de Michel” (Baillet 1982: 26–29), the majority of subsequent scholarship has strongly suggested a human figure that undergoes angelomorphism (even apotheosis).

⁴³⁾ One cannot overlook the priestly nature of these ascents (Himmelfarb 1993: 9–46); heaven is conceptualized as a celestial temple in which the angels and the ascender function as priests, and the endowment of a heavenly, priestly garment (= transformation) enables priestly service before the Great Glory.

2 Enoch, for instance, the patriarch is “extracted” and “put . . . into the clothes of glory,” a process that results in “no observable difference” between Enoch and the angels (22.8–10 (A); (J) is similar). We can also point to several traditions (both pre- and post-Pauline) wherein the righteous dead are said to acquire a heavenly garment.⁴⁴ Though transformation is not presumed in all ascent traditions,⁴⁵ in those where it is the ascender’s proximity to the divine is a key feature; the closer the visionary comes to the divine being, the greater the need for transformation.⁴⁶ Taken together, these texts correlate both locative change (i.e., earth to heaven) and somatic transformation (i.e., earthly body to heavenly body) within a one-world model of cosmo-somatic interrelation.

The traditions examined here point toward a worldview in which heaven and earth stand as vertically configured spatial locales that are mutually accessible via the process of heavenly ascent. Such traditions take for granted the permeability of the cosmos. Far from denoting any kind of radical or oppositional dualism, Martha Himmelfarb (1993: 71) correctly finds in these ascent apocalypses the “possibility of transcendence,” noting:

The descent of a divine figure expresses the certainty that God cares enough for the righteous to send them help. But the ascent apocalypses make greater claims for the nature of humanity: human beings . . . have the potential to become like the angels, or even greater than the angels.

Here, heaven is not ontologically other but rather interconnected with the earth. These traditions point to a worldview that is perhaps best described as *gradient* and conceptualized as a vertically

⁴⁴) See, for example, *Apoc. Zeph.* 8.3–4 (Akmimic text); *1 En.* 62.15–16; and *Apoc. Ab.* 13.14.

⁴⁵) For example, the *Apoc. Ab.* attributes no transformation to Abraham during his ascent, though looks ahead to a future time when Abraham will be clothed with Azazel’s heavenly garment (and Azazel with Abraham’s corruptibility—13.14).

⁴⁶) This theme comes to full articulation in the much later Hekhalot literature, though its roots are found already in Jewish apocalyptic (Murray-Jones 1992).

drawn spectrum from earthly to heavenly. In this sense, then, Jewish apocalyptic points to a gradient cosmological dualism that is characterized by *integration* rather than *opposition*.

The Broader Cultural Circle—Second Temple and Early Judaism

Extending our analysis beyond Jewish apocalyptic, broader biblical and pseudepigraphical traditions further presume this dualistically integrated one-world system; here, the lines between earthly and heavenly *somatic states* are not ontologically drawn, which is to say that permeability extends to somatology as much as cosmology.

In the period just after Paul, a number of traditions describe Adam's pre-lapsarian existence as a state of angelomorphic glory. Some texts insist that Adam was created as "a second angel" (*2 En.* 30.11 (J)), while others assert that the angels were directed to worship the pre-lapsarian couple (*L.A.E.* (Lat.) 13–15).⁴⁷ Related descriptions can be found in *L.A.E.* (Gk.) 20.1–2 and *3 Bar.* 4.16, both of which characterize the lapsarian event as the loss of a garment of glory. These descriptions all betray a strikingly high view of humanity, one in which the pre-lapsarian couple are perceived as being created in a state of divine/angelic "glory."⁴⁸ Such Adamic traditions demonstrate that the boundaries between angels/deities and humanity are blurred in many traditions, thus stressing an ideal human form premised on angelomorphic potentiality.⁴⁹

⁴⁷) See additionally *L.A.E.* (Lat.) 4.1–2 and 47 (// ch. 39 (Gk.)).

⁴⁸) Indeed, Fletcher-Louis (1997: 142) notes, with respect to *L.A.E.* (Lat.): "not only is Adam angelomorphic in this text, he is also unequivocally set over the angels." That such descriptions likely have a broader anthropological referent is suggested in the Enochic *Similitudes* (for example), which insist, "humans were not created to be different from the angels" (*1 En.* 69.11).

⁴⁹) Similar angelomorphic descriptions are ascribed to a number of commemorative figures (e.g. Abel, Enoch, Noah, Jacob/Israel, Moses, Elijah, and the High Priest), thus underscoring this cosmo-somatic permeability. On the theme of angelomorphism, see further Charlesworth 1980.

Within a conceptual world where humanity can be described angelomorphically, perhaps it is not surprising that angels and other divine beings are often described anthropomorphically. A prime example is the angelic figure of Dan. 7, whose description as *בר אנש* may not be titular but rather connotative of his “manlike form.”⁵⁰ Similarly, it is not uncommon to find references to angels as men (e.g. Dan. 9.21; cf. 10.5–6, 16–18), to the Enochic Watchers as being able to lay and procreate with women (e.g. *I En.* 6–7), and to angels being able to speak (e.g. *I En.* 19.1), look (e.g. *I En.* 9.1), stand (e.g. *I En.* 39.12–13), and exist in a perpetual state of wakefulness (e.g. *I En.* 39.12–13; 61.12; 71.7). Indeed, in several instances angels are indistinguishable from humans,⁵¹ thus denoting an *anthropomorphic angelic form*.

Related to angelic anthropomorphisms are the descriptions of the divine via somatic categories. Already in biblical tradition references to the Glory of the Lord (*כבוד יהוה* / *δόξαν κυρίου*) came to acquire the near technical meaning of God’s human appearance.⁵² Such anthropomorphized glory language becomes a key motif in early Jewish throne–chariot and later Merkabah mystical traditions.⁵³ Ezekiel is an early text in this line; here the prophet describes the Glory of the Lord as an enthroned, human-like figure with a luminous, fiery *body* (1.26–28).⁵⁴ Within post-biblical tradition, this Glory figure is increasingly identified as the heavenly agent encountered at the pinnacle of ascent (e.g. *I En.* 14.18–21), and the enthroned figure is

⁵⁰ So argued by Segal 1990: 53; contra Nickelsburg 1999: 800.

⁵¹ For example, see in the HB, Gen. 19.1–3 and 32.25–31; in the NT, Heb. 13.2; and in the Pseudepigrapha, *Jos. and Asen.* 14.3(4).

⁵² For example, see Exod. 33.12–34.9, especially the anthropomorphisms of 33.17–23 and 34.5–6. Additionally, the Glory of the Lord is associated with both clouds and fire such that the presence of Yahweh is understood as having appeared in both (Exod. 16.7 and 10 (comp. 13.21–22); 40.34–38). Among others, see especially Newman 1992.

⁵³ For a full discussion, see Segal 1990: 34–71.

⁵⁴ The Hebrew of 1.26 reads *דמות כמראה אדם* “[something] like the appearance of a man;” the Greek (Rahfls) *ὁμοίωμα ὡς εἶδος ἀνθρώπου* “likeness as the image of a man.” Though a body is not explicitly identified, the description presumes a somatic form and is clearly premised on the idea of anthropomorphic analogy. The same anthropomorphic Glory appears again in Ezek. 8.2, 9.3–4, and 10.4, and there seems to be no distinction between this luminous body of Glory and Yahweh himself (esp. in 9.3–4; cf. Fossum 1999: 349).

often characterized as a *luminous human form* or *glory-body* (comp. *Ezek. Trag.* lines 68–72). In such cases, the anthropomorphic descriptions used of Yahweh are hypostasized, and this embodied glory functions as the material or visible expression of the divine.

If the descriptions of human beings via angelic or divine categories serve to elevate the human form, the related expressions that anthropomorphize the divine stand as the former's obverse. These biblical and pseudepigraphical traditions together point toward a worldview that does not distinguish sharply between heavenly and earthly realms; two worlds exist, yes, but their relation to one another is constructed not via an oppositional but rather an integrative dualism premised on permeability. The possibility of transformation exists; human beings can become angelic and thus possess anthropomorphized glory-bodies.

The Broadest Cultural Circle—Hellenistic Philosophy

Extending our analysis still further, we turn our attention finally toward the broadest cultural context in which Paul exists—namely, Hellenistic philosophical traditions. We can begin by noting that the integrated, one-world model that we have thus far described has an important correlate in broader first century Mediterranean thinking. Focusing on popular Hellenistic philosophy, Dale Martin (1995: 4–37, especially pp. 29–37) illuminates a cosmo-somatic mapping wherein the body, like the universe and society, is conceptualized as a hierarchical spectrum.⁵⁵ Within this mapping, earthly and heavenly are understood as both *spatially* and *qualitatively* different, though not ontologically opposed; thus Martin insists, “a ‘one world’ model is much closer to the ancient conception, and, instead of an ontological dualism, we

⁵⁵) At the bottom end of the spectrum are those things that are less desirable—thick, heavy, weak, passive, ugly, and feminine (which include bodily traits such as being cold, moist, and soft); by contrast, the upper end comprises the more desirable—fine, thin, strong, active, beauty, and masculine (which includes bodily traits such as warmth, dryness, and hardness).

should think of a hierarchy of essence” (p. 15). The most dominant philosophical tradition at the turn of the eras—Stoicism—subscribed to this one-world model,⁵⁶ and Stanley Stowers (2003: 527) has noted that the first century CE was largely dominated by philosophical monism:

All of the [non-platonic] schools of philosophy were so-called materialists or physicalists. Everything in the universe, including God or the gods, is one part of the “natural” or physical order and can in principle be investigated by humans.

More generally, in his assessment of the range of lexical senses for *κόσμος* within Hellenic and Hellenistic usage, Edward Adams (2000: 64–69) insists that notions of *order* and *unity* pervade: “the word *κόσμος* connotes the idea of an ordering of distinctive parts into a *cohesive* unit. Insofar as the universe is a *κόσμος*, it is conceived as a unity, with its varied and constituent elements . . . integrated into a perfect whole” (p. 65, emphasis original).

Within this broader unitary and general physicalist worldview, concepts that we moderns take as immaterial or incorporeal were not understood as such. Heinrich von Staden (2000: 79), for instance, has demonstrated that Hellenistic philosophers and physicians generally considered the *ψυχή* to be a material substance in a way similar to the *σῶμα*: “all *psychē* is *sōma* but not all *sōma* is *psychē*.” Similarly, the Stoics understood *πνεῦμα* as the all-encompassing material substance that permeates and holds the cosmos together,⁵⁷ and Martin (1995) has shown that pneumatic materiality was generally accepted in broader Hellenistic thought.⁵⁸ Though many treatments of Paul understand *πνεῦμα* as the immaterial aspect of humanity’s composition,⁵⁹

⁵⁶⁾ See, for example, Engberg-Pedersen (2010), who stresses the Stoic material *πνεῦμα* as the all-encompassing substance that permeates the created world.

⁵⁷⁾ See especially Engberg-Pedersen 2010: 20.

⁵⁸⁾ Martin (1995: 21–25) notes that *πνεῦμα* was commonly linked with the air/wind (though not exclusively) and was commonly understood as “the life giving material for the members of the body” (p. 22). *Πνεῦμα* was a substance that was both inherent *within* and *external* to human beings; as an entity within the human body, *πνεῦμα* was particularly linked to the optical system, though it was also tied to motion, reason, and life itself.

⁵⁹⁾ A few examples will suffice. Despite his insistence that *πνεῦμα* does not stand in contrast to either body or the material world, Bultmann (1951–1955: 1.153) nonetheless defines *πνεῦμα* as the “miraculous divine power that stands in absolute contrast to all that is human.” Though Robert Gundry (1976: 48–49) is critical of Bultmann,

Troels Engberg-Pedersen (2010) has compellingly argued that Paul's pneumatology is thoroughly materialistic. This is, as we have seen, consistent with the broader one-world model that we have been characterizing.

To insist on such a unitary worldview is not to eschew but rather refocus our understanding of dualism. Walter Burkert (1998) has demonstrated that both Greek and Semitic traditions as far back as the Homeric hymns and Akkadian (respectively) understand phenomena such as thought and emotions as being correlated with organs such as the heart, liver, bowels, and even the diaphragm.⁶⁰ At this early stage these descriptions do not represent a strong bifurcation of the human being, though they do attribute to the organs those activities that are later given to the soul.⁶¹ In Greek tradition, it is only in the Hellenic period that this inner referent becomes abstracted and the soul becomes an independent entity. Personhood (or consciousness) is no longer correlated to the organs but instead stands on its own, still located *within* the body though variously thought to be composed of *πνεῦμα*, fire, *aether*, or some other substance (or a mixture thereof).⁶² Though philosophical traditions differed on the precise description of the soul, all located it within the body and further understood it as the centre of human intelligence.⁶³ In contrast, classical Hebraic culture continues to locate the epicentre of personhood/consciousness with the “heart” (לב or לבב) or the נפש,⁶⁴ thus retaining a stronger

he too asserts *πνεῦμα* as ontologically distinct from *σῶμα*, thus arguing (with respect to 1 Cor. 10.10) that “*sōma* retains its purely physical connotation over against *pneuma*,” and later, “the contrast with *pneuma* makes *sōma* exclusively physical.” Similarly, Dunn (1998a: 3) insists “*pneuma* denotes that power which humanity experiences as relating it to the spiritual realm, the realm of reality which lies beyond ordinary observation and human control.”

⁶⁰ On the development and demarcation of the self in the western tradition, see Taylor 1989: 111–207.

⁶¹ Thus Burkert (1998: 69) notes, speaking of the Homeric and lyric poets, “there is no separation of corporeal organs and activities of the soul.”

⁶² Burkert 1998: 70–71; see also Martin 1995: 115–120.

⁶³ Compare with Aune (1995: 294–295), who differentiates various philosophical traditions from one another and then offers a synthesis of seven commonly held views regarding the soul.

⁶⁴ נפש comes from the verb נפש (to *inhale, breath* (KB)) and refers variously to many things that are somatically inward (e.g. *throat, breath* (KB); in Lev 17.11 נפש is specifically located *in the blood*). Moreover, נפש is

correlation between the physical organ and the self.⁶⁵ In both instances, however, the locus of personhood/consciousness is correlated with the *somatic interior* (i.e., the soul or some physical organ) vis-à-vis the *visible exterior* (i.e., the body or some body part).⁶⁶ In many ways, these trends indicate that both Greek and Semitic traditions have a proclivity toward weak folk dualism: even though some of the Greek traditions eventually lean in the direction of stronger dualistic expressions, certain capacities (in this case, personhood or consciousness) tend to cluster together and gravitate toward certain poles (in this case, *somatic interior* vis-à-vis the *visible exterior*).

Both Greek and Jewish traditions, then, hold differing shades of dualistic thought, though the ways in which these dualisms are articulated varies; indeed, variety exists within each cultural tradition itself. Though it is well known that Plato advocated an anthropological dualism of Sense–Thought perception, Thomas Robinson (2000) rightly points to developments in Plato’s thought from the strong body–soul opposition in *Phaedo* to the more nuanced inner tension of the trichotomous soul in *Republic* and *Timaeus*;⁶⁷ in this way, Plato holds a much more attenuated view. Standing in the Platonic tradition is Philo of Alexandria, whose exegesis of Gen. 1–2 is commonly identified as the closest historical parallel to the ideologies Paul confronts

understood as something that leaves the body at death and comes back at life (BDB), and it seems at times to convey the idea of the human being him/herself (hence the translation *person, personhood, life* (KB, BDB)).

⁶⁵ Though he only indirectly explores the biblical backgrounds, see Jewett 1971: 305–333 and 447–448.

⁶⁶ This is not to say that ancient thinkers understood human consciousness as a unified singularity that was easily mapped to the somatic interior. For example, Philo (and Plato before him) distinguished not simply between body (*out*) and soul (*in*), but rather between the irrational and rational parts of the soul, which are internal (*in*) and align with either the body or the divine/reason respectively (both, *out*). Herein lies the importance of thinking in terms of weak folk dualism; human consciousness or personhood is partitively constructed, with various interior components that connect to various external referents. This partitive construction stands in contrast to Cartesian notions of the singular, “unitary ‘I’” (cf. Gill 1996: 6–7).

⁶⁷ Robinson (2000: 47) notes that Plato’s description of the soul in the *Timaeus* advocates a tripartite soul-division wherein the highest part of the soul (i.e., Reason) is understood to be both immortal *and* material. This is, as Robinson notes, a development from the earlier *Phaedo* and *Republic* (which held a more *immaterial* view), and it evinces the degree to which the one-world system pervades even Plato’s descriptions.

at Corinth.⁶⁸ While there are several points of connection between Philo and Paul,⁶⁹ the key issue is the Philonic distinction between the heavenly man (who was created in Gen. 1.26–27) and the earthly composite man (who was created in Gen. 2.7). For Philo, the former is the imperishable, incorporeal heavenly ideal that was created according to the divine image and is only perceptible by the mind (*Opif.* 134). By contrast, the latter is a composite being who, as both body and soul, is mortal, formed of the dust, and perceptible by the senses (*Opif.* 134).

Philo envisions the relation between these two men in various ways. In some cases the two are contrasted according to a Platonic Form–Image distinction, thus denoting the heavenly archetype vis-à-vis the earthly and visible expression of that Form (e.g. *Opif.* 24–25; 35–36).⁷⁰ In other places, however, Philo speaks of these two figures being somatically interrelated.⁷¹ In *Who is the Heir*, for instance, Philo insists that the inbreathing of the divine breath at creation (Gen. 2.7) causes the earthly man to be formed “after the image” (*Her.* 56), a phrase that Philo elsewhere and much more ubiquitously reserves for the heavenly man (e.g. *Opif.* 134).⁷² Here the two men come into closer somatic correlation; Philo understands the earthly man as a trichotomous *mind/spirit–soul–body*,⁷³ and he correlates the heavenly man with the earthly man’s

⁶⁸) See, for example, Pearson 1973; Horsley 1976; and more recently, Sterling 1995.

⁶⁹) With respect to resurrection, the key connections are fourfold: (1) Paul’s use of Gen. 2.7 in 1 Cor. 15.45; (2) the contrasting of the heavenly and earthly men (e.g. compare 1 Cor. 15.47–49 with Philo, *Leg.* 1.31–32; *Opif.* 134); (3) the description of Adam as the “first man” (e.g. compare 1 Cor. 15.45, 47 with Philo, *Opif.* 136–50); and (4) the description of the heavenly man as the divine/life-giving spirit (e.g. compare 1 Cor. 15.45 with Philo, *Her.* 56–57).

⁷⁰) Thus Levison (1987: 85), speaking of *QG* 2.56, notes that the “Platonic distinction between noetic pattern and sense copy” is unequivocally present.

⁷¹) Cf. Kooten 2008: 64–66; see also Kooten 2010.

⁷²) Noted by Pearson 1973: 19.

⁷³) It was more common in the Hellenistic world to draw a trichotomous distinction between *mind–soul–body* (νοῦς–ψυχή–σῶμα), and indeed Philo himself employs this construction very frequently. Nonetheless, at several points Philo correlates *mind* and *spirit* (νοῦς and πνεῦμα), which has led some to argue for a specifically Jewish interpretation of the Platonic trichotomy (not *mind–soul–body* but *spirit–soul–body*)—see especially Pearson 1973: 17–21; Horsley 1976: 270–275; and Kooten 2008: 279–280; 2010.

mind/spirit.⁷⁴ Though Philo certainly retains a strong sense of differentiation between the two men,⁷⁵ the key distinction in this text is less about *body–soul* opposition and more about proper *body–soul* alignment. That is to say, Philo’s blurring of the earthly and heavenly men has less to do with cosmology and more to do with ethical reflection. Philo continues in *Her. 57* by stressing two opposing human “forms” (or “races” (*Leg. 1.31*)), one that is the earthly man who lives according to “blood and the pleasure of the flesh” (i.e., the *ψυχή*), the other that is the heavenly man who lives according to the “divine spirit-reason” (*πνεῦμα/νοῦς*).⁷⁶ Philo does not have a Form–Image opposition in mind but rather contrasting modes of ethical behaviour understood as the trichotomous *mind–soul–body* being submitted to the divine breath. Though Philo, on the whole, is otherwise a stricter dualist than many, at times his cosmo-somatology is much more integrative than oppositional (especially with respect to ethical ideals).

Summary: Concentric Circles of Cultural Embodiment

The preceding excursion through these concentric cultural circles has demonstrated a widespread one-world model characterized less by *opposition* and more by *integration*. The examined Jewish traditions demonstrate this in two ways. On the one hand, heaven and earth are upheld as distinct spatial locales that each require their own somatic state. On the other hand, these locations are characterized by a high degree of permeability; travel between them is possible, and

⁷⁴) Thus Kooten (2008: 65), in commenting on a similar blurring in *Leg. 1.42*: “in Philo’s view, the Spirit which is inbreathed into the highest part of (the individual, earthly) man is virtually identical with the image of God after which (the heavenly) man is created.”

⁷⁵) While the two men certainly do overlap with one another, Kooten (2008: 66) seems to overreach when he suggests, “the defining difference between the first and second type of man is above all the fact that the second type is composite because he consists of Spirit and body.” On the surface this seems to presume a level of pneumatic materialism that is at odds with Philo’s ontological commitments.

⁷⁶) In *Her. 56–57*, Philo uses “blood and pleasures of the flesh” (*αἷματι καὶ σαρκὸς ἡδονῆ*) rather than *ψυχή* to speak of the *lower soul*. Nonetheless, Philo draws on Lev 17.11 so as to insist that *αἷμα* correlates with the soul (*ψυχή*) generally (i.e., the lower soul), while *πνεῦμα* correlates with the dominant part of the soul (the upper soul—*Heir. 55–56*).

transformation from one somatic state into another (more idealized) state is expressly articulated. Accordingly, the obverse possibilities of human angelomorphism and divine anthropomorphism demonstrate that, though distinctions exist between celestial and terrestrial, they are not sharply delineated. Within broader Hellenistic thought, most philosophical traditions of the first century CE held to a thoroughly materialist worldview premised upon a hierarchical scale of cosmological qualities. Even those who held a more radical dualism of Sense–Thought perception nevertheless maintained the importance of body–soul *interrelation* rather than opposition.

Paul’s Characterization of the *σῶμα πνευματικόν* in 1 Corinthians 15.35–40

Within these broader one-world tendencies that identify opposing forces within a single system, where do we place Paul and his resurrection ideals? As a way of exploring some implications of the preceding, the following will briefly examine 1 Cor. 15.35–50, specifically with respect to Paul’s description of the *σῶμα πνευματικόν*. As we will see, attention to partitive interrelations—specifically the interconnectivity of distinct elements within a whole—helps illuminate how Paul constructs meaning through his exchange with his Corinthian interlocutors.

We can first note that the main focus of Paul’s address in 15.35–50 is upon the risen form of the visibly exterior human body. This is seen already in 15.35, where Paul identifies the issue in question as pertaining to the kind of “body” (*σῶμα*) with which the dead are raised. Paul continues by stressing both agricultural (15.37–38) and garment-exchange (15.49) metaphors, both of which are utilized because they highlight the transformation that takes place between *two different external forms* (e.g. the seed and the full-grown plant, both of which Paul metaphorically refers to as *σῶμα*). Indeed, Paul contrasts the heavenly and earthly bodies as states that believers exist *in*; one is either “*in* [ἐν] imperishability, glory, and power” or “*in* [ἐν]

perishability, dishonour, and weakness” (15.42–43). Paul’s language here is multivalent in as much as he locates Jewish notions of heavenly glory-bodies within an overarching cosmological status-hierarchy. Here, then, Jewish apocalyptic and Graeco-Roman popular philosophy coalesce, and they do so with a clear focus upon the transformation of the *somatic exterior*.

This decidedly external focus is interrupted, however, in 15.44, where Paul terminologically identifies a risen body as a *σῶμα πνευματικόν* and an earthly body as a *σῶμα ψυχικόν*. Paul’s focus shifts here; rather than contrasting differing *external* bodies as the states into which believers are raised (again, note the use of *ἐν* in 15.42–43), Paul now draws a distinction between *internal* referents (i.e., *ψυχή* and *πνεῦμα*). To describe this shift in crude spatial terms, Paul transitions from a description of the *container* itself (that is, the body, which is external and can contain certain things) to now contrasting the *contents* of the container (that which is inside the body). This shift is both sudden and stark, and while it has not gone unnoticed by modern exegetes, three common scholarly interpretations can be briefly problematized. First, given the one-world model outlined above, we can put aside the claim that the phrase *σῶμα πνευματικόν* is oxymoronic.⁷⁷ As we have seen, *incorporeal* does not necessarily denote *immaterial*, and thus there is no compelling reason to understand the adjective *πνευματικός* as ontologically opposed to *σῶμα*. Second, many have argued that the phrase *σῶμα πνευματικόν* denotes the *material composition* of the risen body (i.e., a body composed of *πνεῦμα*).⁷⁸ While this view coheres with the one-world model that we have posited, it fails to

⁷⁷⁾ For example, Segal (1998: 418) insists that *σῶμα πνευματικόν* “is a complete contradiction in terms for anyone in a Platonic system.”

⁷⁸⁾ Martin (1995: 126) is a recent proponent of this view: he argues that, for Paul, a resurrected body is “composed only of pneuma,” and further that risen bodies represent a kind of refinement such that resurrection is akin to the heavy material of *σάρξ* being “sloughed off” so as to leave only the light material of *πνεῦμα*. As articulated below, my main concern with this interpretation is the fact that Paul seeks to posit a heavenly *container* that stands in contrast to the earthly *container* (i.e., body vis-à-vis body (15.44), or garment vis-à-vis garment

address the parallel description of the *σῶμα ψυχικόν* (which is not a body composed of *ψυχή*).⁷⁹

The third scholarly position, which we have already introduced above, suggests *σῶμα πνευματικόν* denotes a body that is *under the rule of the Spirit*. While this view is dominant in Pauline scholarship, it places the transformative emphasis upon the somatic *interior* (*ψυχή* and *πνεῦμα*) rather than *exterior* (*σῶμα*); as we have said, Paul’s focus in 15.35–50 is squarely on the somatic exterior. Taken together, none of these views are wholly preferable.

Paul’s address in 1 Cor. 15.45–49 seems particularly indebted to some form of Philonic exegesis of Gen. 1–2. Although the apostle confronts this exegesis (see 15.46), in one important respect he is aligned with it. As already noted, in certain instances Philo stresses the *interrelation* of the earthly and heavenly men; that is to say, the earthly man *lives as* the heavenly man when his actions are informed by the higher soul, which is the inbreathed *πνεῦμα* (= *νοῦς*). On this point Paul seems in general agreement with Philo, and he uses it to his rhetorical advantage. In 1 Cor. 2.14–3.3 Paul similarly contrasts the “ensouled man” (*ψυχικός . . . ἄνθρωπος*) with the “enspirited [man]” (*πνευματικός*), not with respect to the *future* but rather the *present*. The “enspirited [man]” is specifically said to have the “mind of Christ” (*νοῦν Χριστοῦ*), while the “ensouled man” is correlated with the flesh. Thus Paul’s characterization of the

(15.49, 53–54)), and it is worth noting that Paul elsewhere rejects any notion of an eschatological stripping or “slough[ing] off,” to use Martin’s term (cf. 2 Cor. 5.1–5). Accordingly, it seems pertinent to explore how Paul envisions heavenly *re-embodiment*—a new *container*, as it were—that also makes sense within the process of somatic refinement that Martin so helpfully illuminates.

⁷⁹⁾ It is important to note that the *σῶμα ψυχικόν* that Paul has in mind certainly does presume a particular kind of compositional character—not a body composed of *ψυχή* (though this would not be wholly inconceivable in the Hellenistic period (see Staden 2000)), but rather a body composed of *σὰρξ καὶ αἷμα* (1 Cor 15:50). At issue is the parallel logic between scholarly treatments of the *σῶμα ψυχικόν* vis-à-vis the *σῶμα πνευματικόν*; that is to say, it is not entirely obvious why *πνεῦμα* should be seen as the compositional material of the *container* (i.e., *σῶμα πνευματικόν* as a *body* composed of *πνεῦμα*) if the same logic is not extended to *σῶμα ψυχικόν* (which Paul understands as a *container* (= body) composed of *σὰρξ καὶ αἷμα* rather than *ψυχή*). Given Paul’s explicit insistence in 1 Cor. 15.50, it seems reasonable to presume a *σῶμα πνευματικόν* need not be composed of *πνεῦμα*.

Corinthians as “fleshly” (σάρκινος—3.1–3) serves as a critique that cuts to the core of their pneumatic identity; Paul is insisting that they are in fact dominated by the lower, earthly part of the soul rather than the higher, heavenly part. The rhetorical thrust of Paul’s address, then, is his insistence that the Corinthians are not submitting to the upper soul (πνεῦμα or νοῦν Χριστοῦ).

It is important to note what Paul and his Corinthian interlocutors take as implicit; namely, because the upper soul is presently *embodied* there exists an inherent tension between the πνεῦμα/νοῦς and the ψυχή/σάρξ. Indeed, this tension seems to underscore the presumption of some Corinthians that body will one day be disposed of in favour of the disembodied πνεῦμα (cf. 15.35). But for Paul the problem is not one of embodiment, but rather the *kind* of body in which the πνεῦμα/νοῦς exists; that is to say, rather than positing the *spirit’s disembodiment* as the eschatological ideal, Paul instead posits the *spirit’s re-embodiment*.⁸⁰ Seen in this way, Paul draws a caricature in 1 Cor. 15.44 between two embodied extremes—on the one hand, the *ensouled earthly body* (σῶμα ψυχικόν); on the other, the *enspirited risen body* (σῶμα πνευματικόν). He contrasts two different embodied states (the body informed by the ψυχή/(σάρξ) vis-à-vis the body informed by the πνεῦμα/(νοῦς)),⁸¹ neither of which is characteristic of believers

⁸⁰⁾ On this point Paul stands in contrast to Philo and perhaps his Corinthian interlocutors.

⁸¹⁾ The language of “informed by” is preferable to the standard scholarly parlance of “subjected to” for three main reasons. First, while “subjected to” implies a more ontological distinction between subject and object, the language of “informed by” makes no such distinction and thus retains the character of the one-world model advocated here. Accordingly, “informed by” implies something similar to the Aristotelian *hylomorphic* notion of body and soul as “two mutually complementary and inseparably connected aspects”; for Aristotle, such conjunction “is necessary for life . . . [and constitutes] a natural and good relationship” (Eijk 2000: 63). Though Aristotle at times advocates an incorporeal understanding of ψυχή, his overarching concern is the exploration of body–soul intermixing. Second, the limits of this integrative “informed by” is found in the fact that, while Paul (like Aristotle) speaks of body–soul intermixing, he also follows something closer to a Platonic notion of body–soul tension or hostility, not between ψυχή/πνεῦμα and σῶμα *per se*, but rather between πνεῦμα and *earthly* σῶμα (and ψυχή and *heavenly* σῶμα). The language of “informed by,” then, reflects Paul’s conviction that bodies interact with ψυχή or πνεῦμα in ways—either harmonious or hostile—relative to their cosmo-somatic locations. Finally, the language of “subjected to” (or “under the rule of”) implies a certain personification of πνεῦμα that seems alien to the first-century context and perhaps reflects, as Stanley Stowers (2008: 363) remarks, later developments in Trinitarian Christianity. The language of “informed by” is preferable because it

in the present.⁸² With the exception of certain moments of rhetorical critique (e.g. 1 Cor. 3.1–3), Paul otherwise characterizes life in Christ as an embodied existence that lies between these two poles—i.e., an *enspirited earthly body*. Seen in this light, in 15.44 Paul is essentially saying: *if there is an ensouled body that is designed for and thus tends toward body–soul coherence on earth (i.e., fleshly existence), then there also is an enspirited body that is designed for and thus enables body–spirit coherence in heaven (i.e., pneumatic existence)*. As with Philo, where cosmology and anthropology coalesce, ethical imperatives follow—for Paul, life as an *enspirited earthly body* in the present has a decidedly eschatological outlook in as much as it anticipates one’s future existence as an *enspirited risen body* (σῶμα πνευματικόν).

The key interpretive issue, however, is the stress that Paul places upon *body–soul interrelation*, which can only be recognized when dualism in Paul is seen to stress *integration* rather than *opposition*. To this end, the term *polarity* may provide a better way of conceptualizing this intra-somatic tension. Polarity is adopted not in the sense of opposition (e.g. “polar opposites”) but rather in the sense of an integrated system; it implies *a unified whole wherein opposing forces exist in interdependent tension*.⁸³ This tension is *interdependent* because the individual parts of the system are understood to be inextricable with the whole. This kind of interconnection is essential to understanding Paul’s cosmo-somatic ideals, not only because the apostle perceives contrasting categories as systemically integrative rather than determinatively opposed, but also because such *polarity* is only resolved in the future resurrection when πνεῦμα/νοῦς will be ideally matched *within* a heavenly glory-body. Consistent

retains the idea of distinct substances as intermixing and acting one upon the other rather than of individuated persons ruling one over the other (though this point warrants further examination).

⁸²⁾ Kooten (2008: 301) has similarly noted this caricature.

⁸³⁾ In this way, the present study differs from Jeffrey Asher’s (2000) monograph on 1 Cor. 15, where he employs the term *polarity* as a synonym for *opposition*.

with his broader address in 15.35–40, then, Paul’s focus is squarely upon the expectation of a transformed *exterior*, specifically one that does not exhibit intra-somatic tension with the *πνεῦμα/νοῦς*.

Returning to the second and third scholarly positions noted above (the first has already been addressed), Paul is not so much stressing an embodied existence that will be *under the rule of the Spirit* (position #3) as he is stressing an embodied existence *properly suited for life informed by πνεῦμα*.⁸⁴ The stress is very much upon the somatic exterior: it will be a body that is qualitatively appropriate both for the heavens and the indwelling *πνεῦμα* (contra the present earthly body of flesh and blood). Throughout 1 Cor. 15, however, Paul is cryptically ambiguous about compositional makeup (position #2). Though he certainly looks ahead to a body that is cosmologically appropriate for the heavens and thus ideally informed by *πνεῦμα* (just as an earthly body is suited toward *ψυχή*), Paul also characterizes this body as being one of *glory* (15.40–41). When seen within the context of both Paul’s other writings and the concentric circles noted above, Paul appears to conceptualize the *σῶμα πνευματικόν* as an angelomorphic glory-body,⁸⁵ one that may or may not be compositionally pneumatic but is certainly ideally informed by *πνεῦμα*.⁸⁶ For Paul, then, the body properly suited for *πνεῦμα* is the angelomorphic glory-body of Jewish apocalyptic—that is, the ideal human form into which the adept are transformed upon ascent to heaven. Accordingly, Paul is best seen as synthesising various Greek

⁸⁴) It is possible that Paul has both the human *πνεῦμα* and the divine *πνεῦμα* (i.e., Christ, the *πνεῦμα ζωοποιούν* (1 Cor. 15.45)) in mind, whereby the efficacious power of the former is enabled through the granting of the latter (compare, for example, the use of *πνεῦμα* in Rom. 8.1–11).

⁸⁵) Elsewhere, Paul characterizes resurrection using the category of “glory” (e.g. Rom. 8.17–18), and he often describes the risen Christ as having a “body of glory” (Phil. 3.21; cf. 2 Cor. 3.18; 4.4–6).

⁸⁶) That is to say, just as the risen Christ is both *pneumatic* (1 Cor. 15.45) and characterized by a *glory-body* (Phil. 3.21), so too will believers.

and Jewish traditions while also working with a strong sense of interconnectivity between distinct cosmological and somatic elements.

Conclusion

This paper has argued, in many ways, for a more monistic vision of Paul's apocalypticism while also insisting on a more dualistic vision of Paul's anthropology. In so doing, however, I have not constructed dualism and monism as opposing categories, but rather insisted on a more integrative vision that stresses the systemic unity of distinct parts. This is consistent, we have seen, with the broader cultural contexts in which Paul and his Corinthians interlocutors existed, as well as with the growing body of cross-disciplinary literature that suggests weak folk dualism is a cognitive default shared by the human animal across cultures. Despite Paul's contrasting of differing bodies via metaphors of transformation, notions of *intra-somatic polarity* permeate the apostle's cosmo-somatology. Indeed, Paul understands the current *enspirited earthly body* to exist in a state of *intra-somatic tension*, standing between the extreme caricatures he draws of the *ensouled earthly body* (σῶμα ψυχικόν) and *enspirited heavenly body* (σῶμα πνευματικόν). In so doing, Paul presumes believers to have already been transformed inwardly (through the granting of the πνεῦμα) while also stressing the future transformation of the somatic exterior (i.e., the σῶμα) such that the latter will be an embodied state perfectly suited for the πνεῦμα/νοῦς. Partitive understandings of the human subject are central to Paul's anthropology (as to his cosmology), though the precise nature of such partitions is characterized by integration and interrelation rather than opposition and difference. Recognising this point, however, is only possible when the apostle's cosmology and anthropology are brought into coordination. The bifurcation of

these categories into contradicting dualistic and monistic stances does more to obscure than illuminate the apostle's thought, especially his resurrection ideals.

Funding

The author gratefully acknowledges the Fonds de recherche du Québec—société et culture, whose generous support enabled the updating, presentation (at the 2012 Annual Meeting of the Society of Biblical Literature, Chicago, Ill.), revision, and dissemination of this research.

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